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INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of federal water pollution
law is wetland regulation.1 Wetlands are typically marshy or swampy
areas with hydrologic soils and vegetation. Their ecological value is
widely recognized,2 but wetlands often stand in the way of lucrative
commercial development projects.3 Thus, the battle over the validity
of federal wetland regulation is a classic fight between
environmentalists and industry.4 The wetlands controversy is also
paradigmatic of the perpetual struggle to define the constitutional
limits to federal regulation.
The country's main water pollution control law, the Clean Water
Act (CWA), purports to regulate all "navigable waters,"5 which it
defines as "waters of the United States."6 Although wetlands are not
themselves navigable, section 404 of the CWA requires obtaining a
federal permit from the Army Corps of Engineers ("the Corps")
before discharging "dredged or fill material"7 into wetlands. The
permit requirement applies to individual property owners and
commercial developers alike,8 and is therefore a significant

1. See Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A
Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the
States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242, 1243 (1995) (noting that section 404 is the center of the federal
wetlands regulation controversy because its scope has been in dispute since the CWA was
enacted in 1972).
2. See Elaine Bueschen, Do Isolated Wetlands Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce?
46 AM. U. L. REV. 931 , 955-56 (1997) (noting that wetlands promote biodiversity as well as
play an important role in flood control, preventing $30.9 billion in flood damage annually);
see also Houck & Rolland, supra note 1 , at 1243-50.
3. See Houck & Rolland, supra note 1 , at 1243 (noting that federal wetland regulation
"pits America's most biologically-productive and most rapidly-diminishing ecosystems
against rights of private ownership and property development"). A well-publicized case
involving a commercial developer's challenge to CWA-based wetland permit requirements is
United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997). Wilson was developing a large-scale
project in Charles County, Maryland, when he was indicted for, and eventually convicted of,
illegally filling over fifty acres of protected wetlands without obtaining the required permit
from the Army Corps of Engineers. Id. at 254. Wilson appealed his conviction to the Fourth
Circuit, and won on Commerce Clause grounds. Id. at 257.
4. See Houck & Rolland, supra note 1 , at 1243 (describing the federal regulation of
wetlands as a "tough, nasty business") (quoting Efforts to Combat Marine Pollution Not
Keeping Pace with Growth, State Group Told, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1934, 1934-35 (Dec. 18.
1987) (quoting Jim Ross, Director of Oregon Department of Land Conservation and
Development)).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000).
6.

Id.

§ 1362(7).

7. Id. § 1 344.
8. See Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl and the Menace of Mr. Wilson:
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L.
1, 26 (1999); Houck & Rolland, supra note 1 , at 1252.
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impediment to development projects that involve wetlands.9
In addition, cntlcs have always maintained that Congress's
regulatory power does not extend to isolated wetlands because they
are not navigable.10
The Federal Government's constitutional authority to regulate
water pollution arises from the Interstate Commerce Clause.11
Historically, Congress's power over waters was tied to the national
need to regulate navigation as an aspect of commerce.12 This authority
has come to be known as the "navigable waters doctrine" and was
expanded by Congress early on to serve environmental goals.13 In fact,
Congress's authority under the doctrine to regulate pollution of
navigable-in-fact waters - waters that are actually navigable, as
distinguished from "navigable waters," which has become a term of art
- has been well-settled for more than a century.14 However, the
extent to which the federal government can constitutionally regulate
waters that are not navigable-in-fact has never been clear, and is
controversial to this day.
9. See Jonathan Adler, Swamp Rules: The End of Federal Wetland Regulation?,
22 REG., Summer 1999, at 11, 14, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/
regv22n2/swamprules.pdf ("To developers and property rights activists, Section 404 imposes
a repressive burden that often disenfranchises small land owners."); see also, Fed. Reg.
38,650, 38,659 (July 27, 1995) (discussing the reduction in the "regulatory burden" that
would be achieved through an alternative permitting program for non-commercial single
family home renovation projects, as opposed to the usual section 404 wetlands permit). Even
more daunting than the burdens imposed by the section 404 permit requirement itself are
the potential consequences of non-compliance. In United States v. Wilson, for example,
developer James Wilson failed to procure the necessary permits before filling over fifty acres
of wetlands, which resulted in a jury conviction, a 21-month jail term, and several million
dollars in fines. 133 F.3d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1997).
10. See e.g., Adler, supra note 8, at 36 (arguing that the federal interest in protecting
wetlands arises from the need to keep navigable waterways navigable and thus does not
implicate isolated wetlands).
11. The Interstate Commerce Clause endows the Congress of the United States with the
authority to make laws to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824) ("All America understands,
and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce,' to comprehend navigation. . . . The
power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the
people of America adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in forming
it."); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1871); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3
Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1866).
13. For example, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§ 401 (2000), mandated that no person may deposit refuse in navigable waters or their
tributaries unless a federal permit was obtained. See Virginia S. Albrecht & Stephen M.
Nickelsburg, Could SWANCC Be Right? A New Look at the Legislative History ofthe Clean
Water Act, 32 ENVfL. L. REP. 11042, 11043-45 (2002), available at http://www.elr.info/
articles/vol32/32.11042.cfrn (discussing the early navigable waters doctrine and the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899); Roderick E. Walston, The Federal Commerce and Navigation
Powers: Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County's Undecided Constitutional Issue, 42
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 723-24 (2002) (same).
14. See Walston, supra note 13, at 722-23.
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Proponents of federalism in this area have always maintained that
regulation of intrastate wetlands should be left to the states as part of
the traditional state authority over land use.15 Such federalism
concerns, of course, emerged as a driving force in the Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the mid-1990s. The Court's
opinions in United States v. Lopez16 and United States v. Morrison,17
striking down Commerce Clause-based federal regulation of criminal
activity, only increased the calls for scaling back the most controversial
wetland measures.18
Any Commerce Clause-based regulation must now be evaluated
through the lens of the Lopez Commerce Clause framework. 19 In
Lopez, the Court denied federal jurisdiction to criminally prosecute
Alfonso Lopez for violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act
(GFSZA) on the ground that the law was not within Congress's power
to regulate interstate commerce. In so holding, the Court stated that it
was refusing to extend the federal commerce power any further than it
had been extended in the previous half-century.20 The Lopez Court
appraised the Court's previous Commerce Clause cases, and
concluded that three broad categories of activity are recognized as
within Congress's regulatory authority.21 First, the Court recognized
Congress's plenary authority to regulate the use of channels of
commerce.22 Second, Congress is empowered to regulate the
instrumentalities of commerce, identified as persons or things in
interstate commerce.23 Third, Lopez recognized Congress's authority
to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.24
Two of these categories are potential sources of water pollution laws.
Congress may legislate to protect the channels of commerce,
including "navigable waters."25 Congress may further regulate

15. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 8, at 36.
16. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
17. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
18. See Adler, supra note 8, at 42 (arguing that "[w]etland federalism is likely to provide
sounder policy and more effective environmental protection than the current approach.").
19. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 ("Lopez . . . provides the proper framework for
conducting the required analysis.").
20. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (acknowledging the broad language of past Commerce
Clause opinions, but declining to "proceed any further").
21. Id. at 558-59.
22. Id. at 558.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 558-59 ("Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.") (citations omitted).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
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activities that pollute waters where those activities substantially affect
interstate commerce.26
The navigable waters doctrine was traditionally a subset of the
channels-of-commerce power and dates back to Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden.21 However, until the Supreme
Court considered the issue in 2000,28 it was widely thought that the
navigation power allowed Congress to regulate waters that
substantially affected commerce.29 In fact, then-Justice Rehnquist
wrote for the Court in Kaiser Aetna v. United States that
"congressional authority over the waters of this Nation does not
depend on a stream's 'navigability."'30 Rehnquist went on to write that
the federal navigation power - or even the presence of water - is
irrelevant in determining whether the regulated activities are
"susceptible of congressional regulation under the Commerce
Clause," since the only relevant inquiry is the effect on interstate
commerce.31 This language illustrates that federal water regulation fell
into what the Lopez Court subsequently termed the "substantial
effects" category, rather than the "channels of commerce" category.32
After Kaiser Aetna, and an important case from the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia holding that the Corps must define
"navigable waters" broadly to include as many waters as possible
under the Commerce Clause,33 the Corps promulgated CWA-based

26. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v.United States, 444U.S. 164 (1979).
27. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824); see also Kaiser Aetna, 444U.S. at 170-80 (1979);
United States v. Grand River Darn Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960); United States v. Twin City
Power Co., 350U.S. 222 (1955); United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311U.S. 377
(1940); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); United
States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174U.S. 690 (1899).
28. See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that
Congress intended the CWA to cover, as much as possible, all waters of the United States);
Deltona Corp. v.United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1186 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (same).
30. Kaiser Aetna, 444U.S. at 173-74. This case involved a challenge to the application of
the federal "navigable servitude" to a marina that was formerly, before dredging, a "pond"
on private property. Id. The holding of the case was that although the Corps has the
authority to regulate a navigable marina in the interests of interstate commerce, forcing the
owners of the private marina to open it up to the public amounted to a compensable taking.
Id. at 178.
31. Id. at 173-74.
32. Kaiser Aetna preceded Lopez by nearly two decades, and went unmentioned by the
Lopez Court in its appraisal of past Commerce Clause cases. Kaiser Aetna made clear,
however, that "[t]he cases that discuss Congress' paramount authority to regulate waters
used in interstate commerce are . . . best understood when viewed in terms of more
traditional Commerce Clause analysis [i.e., whether the regulated "activities 'affect'
interstate commerce"] than by reference to whether the stream in fact is capable of
supporting navigation. . . . " Id. at 174.
33. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975). In the
water pollution context, the substantial effects doctrine reaches bodies of water not
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regulations over waters based on their effect on interstate commerce.34
Thus, the judicial willingness to consider the navigable waters doctrine
as coextensive with the substantial effects power, rather than the
channels-of-commerce power, paved the way for expansive federal
regulations under the CWA.35 The agencies soon asserted, and the
courts upheld, jurisdiction over intrastate, isolated wetlands, even
when situated completely on private property - all based on a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.36
Despite the seemingly limitless expansion of federal jurisdiction in
this area, the term "navigable waters" remained the operative
statutory language. Although the language seemed like something of a
holdover from a bygone era,37 it surprisingly became the centerpiece of
the Supreme Court's decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v.

United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC).38

SWANCC

involved a challenge to the "Migratory Bird Rule"

reachable under the channels-of-commerce power, because of the latter's reliance on the
concept of navigability.
34. The Corps has issued regulations defining "waters of the United States" to include:
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible
to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows,
playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could
affect interstate or foreign commerce . . . ;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United States under
the definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(l) through (4) of this section;
(6) The territorial seas;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands)
identified in paragraphs (a)(l) through (6) of this section.
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2004).
35. See Adler, supra note 8, at 25-26 (discussing the Corps' efforts to expand its
jurisdiction over waters that were not navigable-in-fact following Callaway).
36. See United States v. TGR Corp., 171 F.3d 762, 764-65 (2d Cir. 1999); United States
v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 1997); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d
1388, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955 (1995);
Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993); Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765
F.2d 126, 129-30 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Texas Pipeline Co., 611 F.2d 345, 347
(10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir.
1974); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1185-86 (D. Ariz. 1975).
37. See Ashland Oil, 504 F.2d at 1323 (noting that the conference bill of the CWA
defines the term "navigable waters" broadly for water quality purposes: "It means all 'the
waters of the United States' in a geographical sense. It does not mean 'navigable waters of
the United States' in the technical sense as we sometimes see in some laws." (quoting 118
CONG. REC. 33756 (1972) (Statement of Rep. Dingell))).
38. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
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(MBR),39 which served as the basis for federal jurisdiction over
abandoned gravel pits that had filled with water4° and were used by
migrating birds in their interstate travels.41 The municipal consortium
challenging the federal permit requirement argued that Congress
could not require a section 404 permit because there were no
"navigable waters" involved.42 The consortium also claimed that
federal regulatory jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands was not within
Congress's Commerce Clause powers.43 The Corps countered that the
CWA's legislative history and broad definition of "navigable waters"
as "waters of the United States" - along with the Court's past
expansive reading of the navigable waters doctrine - indeed
permitted regulation of any water that substantially affected
commerce. Here, the substantial effect was the several million dollars
spent annually by hunters and bird watchers on migrating birds, who
necessarily use water pits as they migrate.44
The Court never reached the validity of the Corps' argument,
however. In deciding SWANCC, the same 5-4 majority that decided
Lopez construed the CWA narrowly to find that Congress had not
expressed a "clear intent" to apply section 404 to isolated, intrastate
waters based only on a substantial effect on interstate commerce.45 For

39. The MBR was the Corps' attempt to "clarify" the scope of its jurisdiction under the
regulation at issue in Wilson, which covered wetlands and other waters that "could affect
interstate or foreign commerce." See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 163-64 (citing 33 C.F.R. §
328(a)(3)). The MBR states that the section 404(a) permit requirement extends to intrastate
waters:
a.

Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird
Treaties; or

b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state
lines; or
c.

Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species; or

d. Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.
51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (Nov 13, 1986).
.

40. The waters at issue in SWANCC were not wetlands, but were alleged by the
government to nonetheless be "waters of the United States." SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164. For
purposes of the Commerce Clause analysis, there is no meaningful difference between
SWANCC's isolated ponds and isolated, intrastate wetlands.
41. Id. at 164-65, 173.
42. Id. at 165-66.
43. Id.

44. Id. at 173.
45. See Jaimie Y. Tanabe, The Commerce Clause Pendulum: Will Federal Environmental
Law Survive in the Post-SWANCC Epoch of "New Federalism"?, 31 ENVTL. L. 1051, 106768 (2001); see also id. at 1060 n.75 ("Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority decision
[in Lopez] joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor concurred
in the decision. The dissenting Justices were Souter, Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg. This is
the same five-to-four split as in the SWANCC decision.") (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68
and SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 159).
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the Court to even reach the issue of whether the agency's
interpretation was constitutionally valid required a clear statement
from Congress that the agency was permitted to promulgate
regulations that "would result in a significant impingement of the
States' traditional and primary power over land and water use."46 To
avoid these "significant constitutional and federalism questions," the
Court held that section 404's jurisdiction was limited to "navigable
waters," a term that must be interpreted to exclude waters that merely
affect commerce, and are neither navigable-in-fact waters, nor
connected to any such waters.47
A slew of challenges have been brought to CWA-based wetland
regulations in the wake of SWANCC, with varying results in the lower
courts.48 The courts are split as to whether the effect of SWANCC was
to limit CWA jurisdiction to only those wetlands that are directly
adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, or to allow federal regulation of
wetlands where there is any hydrological connection to "navigable
waters." Because SWANCC itself did not undertake a constitutional
analysis, these post-SWANCC cases mostly interpret the CWA, and
what SWANCC said about its terms.
This Note explains the constitutional framework of federal water
pollution regulation, and uses post-SWANCC cases for illustration and
support in that endeavor. Part I argues that SWANCC's avoidance of
the difficult constitutional issue through the use of the clear statement
rule revives the navigable waters doctrine as a channels-of-commerce
power. One important implication of this argument is that any
regulation, like the MBR, that invokes substantial effects-based
reasoning is not valid under the CWA.49 Part II argues that because
the channels-of-commerce power is both well-settled and broad in
scope, the federal government can regulate any body of water that is
hydrologically connected to a navigable-in-fact waterway. Part III
addresses the structural federalism concerns underlying Lopez,
arguing that the hydrological connection test advocated for in Part II

46. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
47. Id.
48. See Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Krilich, 303 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2002); Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the
Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002); Headwaters v. Talent Irrigation
Dist., 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001).
49. As noted, the CWA is limited to "navigable waters," which it defines as "waters of
the United States, including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000). This Note
argues that because the CWA was meant as a broad exertion of Congress's commerce
power, the statute extends as far as the relevant constitutional doctrine allows. See infra
Section 11.B. What the relevant constitutional doctrine is, is a separate question. The
principal argument of this Note is that SWANCC has interpreted the relevant constitutional
doctrine to be the channels-of-commerce power rather than the substantial effects power.
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does not offend principles of federalism. Part IV applies the Lopez
substantial effects analysis to potential federal regulation of
isolated, intrastate wetlands, concluding that such regulation is valid
because the filling of wetlands is typically an integral aspect of
economic activity.
I.

THE NAVIGABLE WATERS DOCTRINE AS A
CHANNELS-OF-COMMERCE POWER

SWANCC's narrow construction of the CWA, and its term
"navigable waters," necessarily precludes federal jurisdiction on the
basis of a substantial effect on commerce, thereby reviving the
navigable waters doctrine as a channels-of-commerce power. The
narrow statutory construction employed in SWANCC stemmed from
the Court's desire to avoid a controversial constitutional analysis that
it viewed as "needless" in light of a statutory holding that raised no
significant constitutional questions.50 "This concern is heightened," the
Court wrote, "where the administrative interpretation alters the
federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a
traditional state power."51 The Court then alluded to the substantial
effects arguments that might justify the MBR, noting that it "would
have to evaluate the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce."52 However, the Court
refused to undertake this substantial effects analysis on the ground
that an assertion of such a far-reaching constitutional authority went
well beyond the statutory authority conferred by the term "navigable
waters."53 The Court indicated that the navigable waters doctrine is
distinct from the substantial effects prong of Congress's commerce
power by noting that inclusion of the term "navigable waters" in the
CWA indicated that Congress intended for jurisdiction to at least be
related to navigable-in-fact waters.54 Thus, the Court made clear that
the statutory term "navigable waters" indicates an exercise of the
channels-of-commerce power, and not the more controversial
substantial effects power.

50. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172-73 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
51. Id. at 173 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
52. Id.
53. Id: (noting that the substantial effects rationale underlying the MBR is "a far cry,
indeed, from 'navigable waters' and 'waters of the United States' to which the statute by its
terms extends").
54. Id. at 172 ("The term 'navigable' has at least the import of showing us what
Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over
waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made.").

2146

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 103:2137

Even though SWANCC avoided the issue of how L opez affects
federal constitutional authority to protect the environment, the same
strictures of federalism that guided the Lopez decision also guided the
Court's statute-based holding in SWANCC. Indeed, it was through the
use of a now familiar, but still controversial,55 canon of statutory
construction known as the "clear statement rule"56 that the even more
controversial constitutional analysis was avoided. The precise
principle of statutory construction relied on by the SWANCC Court is
that agencies will not be permitted to construe statutes in such a way
that raises serious constitutional doubts.57 For the Court to consider
the constitutionality of questionable agency action, a clear statement
that Congress intended such action is required.58 Professor Cass
Sunstein has noted that this canon of statutory construction goes "well
beyond" the uncontroversial notion that agencies cannot construe
statutes in such a way that makes them unconstitutional.59 Rather, all
that is necessary in order for the reviewing court to invoke
constitutional avoidance is that the constitutional issue must be
"serious and substantial," and that the statute be fairly capable of an
interpretation contrary to that offered by the agency.6() Because of the
presence of the term "navigable waters" in section 404, the Court
concluded that an alternative interpretation of the navigable waters
doctrine as a channels-of-commerce power is just as plausible, and
avoids the thorny federalism questions raised by the substantial effects

55. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 331 (2000)
(asserting that the modern clear statement rule is more controversial than the traditional
rule that prohibited agencies from construing a statute so as to make it unconstitutional).
56. Professor William Eskridge describes the Rehnquist Court's use of canons of
statutory construction such as clear statement rules as "a self-conscious effort to provide a
subconstitutional way to enforce 'underenforced' constitutional norms," specifically
structural constitutional norms such as nondelegation and federalism. WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 286-87 (1994). These structural
concerns are, Eskridge argues, almost never enforced through constitutional invalidation of
federal statutes. Id.
57. See Sunstein, supra note 55, at 331.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Sunstein concludes that this principle trumps the normal rule of deference to the
agency interpretation, as announced in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Sunstein, supra note 55, at 331. "Chevron deference" is the
doctrinal rule that where statutory language is ambiguous, reasonable agency interpretations
will be upheld. Indeed, the dissent in SWANCC argued for Chevron deference. SWANCC,
531 U.S. at 191 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority, however, "read the statute as written
to avoid the significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by respondents'
interpretation, and therefore reject[ed] the request for administrative deference." Id. at 174.
This Note takes no position on this particular criticism, except to argue that in light of
SWANCC's preference for a narrow construction of the CWA, a precise analysis of the
statutory language is now required for an accurate assessment of current federal jurisdiction
to regulate water pollution.
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rationale offered by the Corps in defense of the MBR.61 The navigable
waters doctrine - interpreted as a channels-of-commerce power does not raise such serious constitutional questions; otherwise the
Court could not have relied on that term in avoiding the difficult
constitutional issue.
The relevant scholarship and policymaking has largely overlooked
the Court's use of this canon, and what it means for the current scope
of federal jurisdiction to regulate water pollution.62 For instance, the
Clinton administration issued a guidance memorandum interpreting
SWANCC on the narrowest possible grounds, as invalidating the
MBR, but not CWA jurisdiction based on other ways in which isolated
waters could affect interstate commerce.63 The memorandum urged
regulators to consult legal counsel where there may be alternate
"connections with interstate commerce [which] might support the

61. Sunstein sees this canon as protecting a background rule of federalism. Sunstein,
supra note 55, at 331 ("The constitutional source of this principle is the evident
constitutional commitment to a federal structure, a commitment that may not be
compromised without a congressional decision to do so - an important requirement in light
of the various safeguards against cavalier disregard of state interests created by the system of
state representation in Congress.").
62. A recent Note argues that the legislative history of the CWA, as relied upon in
S WANCC, indicates that the CWA "sounds in the federal 'power over navigation,' not in the
general commerce power to regulate intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce." Jennifer DeButts Cantrell, Note, For the Birds: The Statutory Limits of the
Army Corps of Engineers' Authority Over Intrastate Waters After SWANCC, 77 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1353, 1375 (2004). Cantrell's Note distinguishes between the navigation power and
Congress's general commerce power, whereas this Note argues that the navigation power is
properly considered a form of the commerce power. The two notes reach the same
conclusion, however: that any substantial effects-based regulation is not supported by the
CWA, as interpreted in S WANCC. Id. at 1375-76. Other literature addressing the statutory
basis for federal jurisdiction after S WANCC also focuses on the legislative history of the
CWA On one end of the spectrum, Albrecht and Nickelsburg argue that in the absence of a
clear expression of Congressional intent to regulate waters other than navigable-in-fact
waters and their immediately adjacent wetlands, there is no federal jurisdiction under
section 404 to regulate tributaries based on a hydrological connection or any other "new
jurisdictional test." Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 13, at 11056-57. Lance Wood, an
environmental lawyer for the Army Corps of Engineers, has responded specifically to the
Albrecht and Nickelsburg article with an alternative reading of the legislative history of the
CWA that supports uniform CWA jurisdiction over tributaries of navigable-in-fact waters.
See Lance D. Wood, Don't Be Misled: CWA Jurisdiction Extends to All Nonnavigable
Tributaries ofthe Traditional Navigable Waters and to their Adjacent Wetlands, 34 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10187 (2004), available at http://www.elr.info/articles/vol34/34.10187.pdf.
63. Memorandum from Gary S. Guzy, General Counsel U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, and Robert M. Andersen, Chief Counsel U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to a
Distribution List of EPA Administrators, Corps Commanders et al., Subject: Supreme Court
Ruling Concerning CWA Jurisdiction over Isolated Waters (Jan. 19, 2001), at
http://www.saj.usace.army.mil/permit/docurnents/swancc.pdf [hereinafter Guzy Memo]. The
memorandum specifically noted that "[w]aters covered solely by subsection (a)(3) that could
affect interstate commerce solely by virtue of their use as habitat by migratory birds are no
longer considered 'waters of the United States."' Id. at 4. "Waters covered solely by
subsection (a)(3)" refers to waters that are not otherwise covered by section 328.3, making
(a)(3) the catch-all subsection for regulatory jurisdiction. See supra note 39.
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assertion of CWA jurisdiction over 'nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate
waters under subsection (a)(3)."'64
Environmental advocacy groups have also urged a narrow reading
of SWANCC on the ground that the Court only specifically
invalidated the MBR.65 This interpretation would allow for CWA
jurisdiction over wetlands that are used, for example, to irrigate crops
that are transported and sold in interstate commerce.66
These arguments are flawed because they ignore the SWANCC
Court's reasoning that the CWA does not authorize federal
jurisdiction over waters based on a constitutionally questionable
rationale. As noted above, the Court not only invalidated federal
jurisdiction based on the MBR, it refused to undertake a Lopez
substantial effects analysis because the Court concluded that the CWA
term "navigable waters" does not support a constitutionally
questionable substantial effects-based regulation. The Court's narrow
method of statutory construction means that had the regulation at
issue asserted any substantial effects rationale - migratory birds,
crops sold in interstate commerce, etc. - the outcome would have
been the same. Thus, neither the Clinton administration guidance nor
the environmental groups' position is valid under the reasoning of
SWANCC, which cabins federal jurisdiction under the CWA in
Congress's power to regulate the channels of interstate commerce.67
SWANCC's use of the clear statement rule in refusing to consider a
substantial effects-based regulation under the CWA means that the
statute is an exercise of Congress's authority over channels of
commerce. As a channels-of-commerce power, the navigable waters
doctrine requires some connection to navigable-in-fact waters. This
authority does not extend to waters which substantially affect
interstate commerce. Thus, any assertion of jurisdiction over waters

64. Guzy Memo, supra note 63, at 4.
65. See, e.g. , Press Release, Natural Resources Defense Council, Bush Administration
Plans to Limit Scope of Clean Water Act (July 11, 2003), available at
http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressreleases/030203.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2004); Sierra Club,,
Supreme Court Removes Wetlands Protection, CLEAN WATER & WETLANDS NE WS (Jan. 9,
2001), at http://www.sierraclub.org/wetlands/news/jan9_01.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2004)
(asserting that S WANCC only invalidated CWA jurisdiction where the Migratory Bird Rule
is the sole basis for regulation).
66. The Corps asserted - along with the MBR - in 1986, that the "waters of the
United States" include those waters that are "[u]sed to irrigate crops sold in interstate
commerce." 51 Fed. Reg. 41, 206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
67. This is true despite a strong argument that such Lopez category three jurisdiction
actually better serves the purpose of the statute and intent of the enacting Congress. See,
e.g., NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. at 686 (holding the Corps' pre-1975 regulations
asserting jurisdiction over only those waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide to be
unreasonably narrow on the grounds that Congress intended to regulate as many waters as
possible under the Commerce Clause for purposes of controlling water pollution).

August 2005]

SW ANCC's Clear Statement

2149

that are not somehow connected to navigable-in-fact waters is not
valid under the statute.
II.

CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE WATER POLLUTION
UNDER THE CHANNELS-OF-COMMERCE POWER IS
WELL-SETTLED AND BROAD IN SCOPE

This Part clarifies the extent of the navigable waters doctrine as a
channels-of-commerce power, something the Fourth Circuit has
acknowledged has never been "entirely clear."68 Indeed, over what
waters the CWA currently permits federal regulations is a debated
issue among the lower courts in the wake of SWANCC. Most post
SWANCC decisions have upheld federal jurisdiction over wetlands
that are hydrologically connected to a navigable-in-fact body of
water.69 Section II.A argues that the hydrological connection test
identified by this line of cases is a proper delimitation of Congress's
authority over channels of commerce. This rationale is supported by
the Lopez Court's recognition of the broad reach of Congress's
powers to not only regulate channels of commerce, but also to protect
them from external sources of harm.70 A minority of courts has
interpreted the SWANCC decision broadly, to require that any
regulated body of water must have a "significant nexus"71 with, or be
directly adjacent to, a navigable waterway.72 Section Il.B argues that
68. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 256.
69. Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Rapanos,
339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003); Cmty.
Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Krilich, 303 F.3d 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding lower court's
determination that "the precise holding of SWANCC was not so broad" as to "remove from
the Corps' regulatory authority all waters that are not adjacent to bodies of open water");
Headwaters v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001); see generally Lawrence
R. Liebesman, Judicial, Administrative, and Congressional Responses to SWANCC, 33
ENVTL L. REP. 10899 (2003), available at http://www.elr.info/articles/vol33/33.10899.cfrn
(discussing post-SWANCC cases).
70. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. Deaton issued an especially strong acknowledgement of
Lopez's affirmation of the channels-of-commerce power by rejecting an argument that this
power restricts Congress to preventing only physical obstructions to navigability. The court
held that Congress's authority to regulate the navigable waters is no less extensive than its
power over any other channel of commerce. Deaton, 332 F.3d at 707 ("[T]here is no reason
to believe Congress has less power over navigable waters than over other interstate channels
such as highways, which may be regulated to prevent their 'immoral and injurious use."'
(quoting Carninetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917))).
71. The term "significant nexus" was used by the SWANCC Court in distinguishing
waters at issue in the present case from the adjacent wetlands at issue in United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985). SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
72. In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2003); Rice v. Harken Exploration
Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001); FD&P Enters., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
239 F. Supp. 2d 509 (D.N.J. 2003); see generally Liebesman, supra note 69, at 10903-04
(discussing post-SWANCC cases).
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this line of cases unduly limits federal jurisdiction to regulate the
channels of commerce.73
A.

Toward a Hydrological Connection Test

Congress's power over the channels of commerce is broad enough
to support federal jurisdiction over wetlands that are hydrologically
connected to navigable-in-fact waters. The channels-of-commerce
power is plenary and is given great deference by the Court74 because it
does not raise the important federalism concerns that regulation of an
intrastate activity affecting commerce does.75 Rather, the navigable
waters doctrine assumes that navigable waters are tied to national
interests - and, presumably, a legitimate exercise of federal power while nonnavigable waters are tied to local interests and are nqt the
proper subject for federal regulation.76 In addition to being well
settled, Congress's authority to regulate the channels of commerce is
extensive. Lopez reaffirmed the broad scope of this power by quoting
from Caminetti v. United States, which upheld the Mann Act barring
the transport of "any woman or girl" in interstate channels for an
"immoral purpose."77 The Act was within congressional authority,
even though the defendant's conduct - transporting a woman across
state lines to "be and become his mistress and concubine"78 - was
entirely noncommercial. Thus, Congress's authority to regulate the
channels of interstate commerce is also quite broad in scope, properly
barring the "injurious uses" of the nation's channels of commerce.79
In 1976 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied this rationale in
upholding federal jurisdiction over nonnavigable tributaries in United

73. See, e.g., Deaton, 332 F.3d at 706-07 (holding that this view of the channels-of
commerce power is too narrow in light of Supreme Court decisions recognizing
Congressional authority to legislate to prevent the injurious use of navigable waters,
including the entry of pollutants from nonnavigable tributaries). The question all these post
S WANCC cases address is whether the asserted connection to navigable waters supports
Clean Water Act jurisdiction. This Note contends that because the CWA is an exercise of
Congress's navigation power - which is itself a channels-of-commerce power - these cases
can be viewed as constitutional cases. Thus, when discussing CW A jurisdiction, this Note is
simultaneously discussing the extent of the Congress's power over waters as channels of
commerce.
74. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 ("[T]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of
interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained,
and is no longer open to question.") (citations omitted).
75. See Walston, supra note 13, at 740-41.
76. Id.
77. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491
(1917)); see also Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485.
78. Caminelti, 242 U.S. at 483.
79. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
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States v. Ashland Oil and Transportation Co.80 The court noted that
water pollution is a "direct threat to navigation - the first interstate
commerce system in this country's history and still a very important
one . . . . It would, of course, make a mockery of those powers if
[Congress's] authority to control pollution was limited to the bed of
the navigable stream itself."81 The court went on to warn that in the
absence of federal control, the tributaries could then be used "as open
sewers" carrying waste into the navigable waters and completely
undermining the federal regulations.82 This rationale is the basis for
federal regulation of waters that are not themselves navigable, but are
hydrologically connected to navigable waters, and is still just as valid
in the wake of SWANCC as it was when the Ashland Oil court
issued its holding.
In Headwaters v. Talent Irrigation District,83 the first significant
post-SWAN CC CWA case, the Ninth Circuit held that even a tenuous
hydrological connection was sufficient to support federal jurisdiction.84
Noting that this holding was necessary to preserve the central goal of
the CWA, which SWANCC left intact, the Headwaters court reasoned
that " [t ]he [CWA] is concerned with the pollution of tributaries as
well as with the pollution of navigable streams, and 'it is incontestable
that substantial pollution of one not only may but very probably will
affect the other. "'85
The Fourth Circuit followed suit in United States v. Deaton,86
finding even intermittent and very distant hydrological connections to
be sufficient to support CWA jurisdiction. The Deaton court
specifically held that the channels-of-commerce power permits
Congress to legislate to prevent the injurious use of navigable waters,
as it did in enacting the CWA.87 Thus, the court upheld federal
jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to a nonnavigable artificial ditch
that flows into the navigable Wicomico River, because there is

80. 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
81. Id. at 1325-26.
82. Id. at 1326 ("The navigable part of the river could become a mere conduit for
upstream waste.").
83. 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001).
84. Id. at 534.
85. Id. (quoting Ashland Oil, 504 F.2d at 1329).
86. 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003).
87. Id. at 707 ("For example, Congress may outlaw the use of navigable waters as
dumping grounds for fill material. The power over navigable waters also carries with it the
authority to regulate nonnavigable waters when that regulation is necessary to achieve
Congressional goals in protecting navigable waters.").
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a "hydrologic connection between the Deaton wetlands and
navigable waters."88
More recently, in Treacy v. Newdunn Associates,89 the Fourth
Circuit found wetlands90 situated on private land, and separated by an
interstate highway from a traditionally navigable river, to be within
CWA jurisdiction.91 The court found that the wetlands were
historically connected to the Stony Run River, but following the
construction of a highway, the connection was more attenuated,
through intermittent surface waters over 2.4 miles of streams and
manmade ditches.92 In support of its holding that the wetlands were
within the meaning of "navigable waters,"93 the court noted that
SWANCC acknowledged that "Congress' concern for the protection
of water quality and aquatic ecosystems indicated its intent to
regulate wetlands 'inseparably bound up with the "waters" of the
United States."'94 Accordingly, SWANCC merely held that "the
Corps's attempted exercise of jurisdiction over isolated ponds that had

88. Id. at 703. Of all the post-SWANNC cases, the Deaton opinion comes closest to
supporting this Note's assertion that SWANCC effectively categorized the navigation power
as a channels-of-commerce power rather than as a substantial effects power. Id. at 709
("SWANCC, of course, emphasizes that the CWA is based on Congress's power over
navigable waters, suggesting that covered nonnavigable waters are those with some
connection to navigable ones."). The Deaton court also held, as this Note asserts, that this
power is plenary and extends as far as necessary to prevent the injurious uses of channels of
commerce, including entry of pollution into navigable waters. Id. at 707. However, the
Deaton court did not indicate in its opinion that it gave any consideration to the method of
statutory construction employed in SWANCC. The Deaton opinion is bolstered by this
Note's assertion that the SWANCC Court must, because it relied on this as a constitutionally
"safe" statutory construction, consider the navigable waters doctrine to be uncontroversial,
even when invoked to regulate nonnavigable waters. See supra Section LB. This is not to
argue that there is no federalism concern when the navigable waters doctrine is invoked.
Indeed, that doctrine assumes that some waters will be within the power of the states to
regulate. See Walston, supra note 13, at 740-41. Part III infra considers the structural
federalism concerns in the context of federal water pollution regulations under the channels
of-commerce power.
89. 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003).
90. Newdunn Associates bought 43 acres of land, 38 of which were wetlands within the
Corps' CWA regulations. Id. at 409-10 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2002)). The Corps'
regulations define "wetlands" as "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or
ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal
circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated
soil conditions." Id. at 409 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2002)).
91. Id. at 415.
92. Id. at 410.
93. Id. at 415 ("We cannot say that the Corps' conclusion that adjacent wetlands are
inseparably bound up with the 'waters' of the United States - based as it is on the Corps'
and the EPA's technical expertise - is unreasonable." (quoting United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985))).
94. Id. (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167).
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no hydrologic connection whatsoever to navigable waters could
not stand."95
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation is correct because, as
demonstrated by past navigable waters cases,96 and even under
SWANCC, the federal navigation power is extensive enough to
support measures that seek to prevent pollution from entering
navigable waters, whether directly or via a hydrological connection.
The Fourth Circuit has thus adopted the proper standard, permitting
the Corps to exert its jurisdiction over "any branch of a tributary
system that eventually flows into a navigable body of water."97 To limit
the navigable waters doctrine any further would unduly restrict
Congress's well-settled authority to legislate against the injurious uses
of the channels of interstate comrnerce.98
B.

Restrictive Interpretations of the Navigation Power Unduly Restrict
Federal Jurisdiction over Channels of Commerce

A few courts have issued more limited holdings that improperly
restrict federal regulation.99 In Rice v. Harken Exploration Co.,100 an
Oil Pollution Act (OPA)101 case, the Fifth Circuit determined that
SWANCC precluded federal jurisdiction over any water that is not
"actually navigable or is adjacent to an open body of navigable
water."102 The court thus removed from the reach of federal regulators
groundwater and a nonnavigable creek into which pollutants seeped,
even though the pollutants from each found their way into the
navigable Canadian River.103
More recently, the Fifth Circuit declared that neither CWA nor
OPA jurisdiction is conferred by a hydrological connection, holding
instead that a nonnavigable body of water is jurisdictional only if it
flows "directly into" a navigable waterway.104 The court reiterated its
definition of adjacency first announced in Rice, that "there must be a

95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121; United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp.
Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
97.

Deaton, 332 F.3d at 711.

98. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558; see also Deaton, 332 F.3d at 707.
99. See Liebesman, supra note 69, at 10899.
100. 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001).
101. The OPA contains the term, "navigable waters," prompting the plaintiffs to argue,
and the court to conclude, that Congress intended for the term to have the same meaning as
under the CWA. Id. at 270.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 265.
104. In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345-47 (5th Cir. 2003).
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close, direct and proximate link."105 In the same vein as the Fifth
Circuit cases, a New Jersey District Court held in FD& P Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers106 that CWA
jurisdiction, and thus the federal navigation power, had shifted away
from a "hydrological connection" test and toward a "significant
nexus" test.107
Both principle and precedent inveigh against such restrictive
interpretations, however. First, the rationale employed by these courts
unduly limits the federal navigation power as a Lopez category one
power. One need look no further than Lopez itself for support of
Ashland Oil's and Newdunn's necessary-and-proper reasoning as it
relates specifically to the federal power over channels of commerce.
The Lopez Court noted the long-settled rule that this power includes
the authority "to keep the channels of interstate commerce free
from immoral or injurious uses."108 This has long included the
regulation of nonnavigable waters from which pollution can flow into
navigable waters.109
The CWA invokes the full extent of this constitutional principle.110
The Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc.111 that the statute extends to nonnavigable waters in order
·
to keep the navigable waters free from pollution outlawed by federal
regulations.112 The Court specifically sanctioned the Corps' argument
for jurisdiction over hydrologically connected wetlands because they
are "inseparably bound up with the 'waters' of the United States."113
In turn, SWANCC specifically endorsed Riverside Bayview's

105. Id. at 346 n.9 (quoting Rice, 250 F.3d at 272) (quotation marks omitted).
106. 239 F. Supp. 2d 509 (D.N.J. 2003).
107. Id. at 516. The FD&P Enterprises court interpreted S WANCC to require more than
a "mere hydrological connection" to support jurisdiction based on the federal navigation
power, thus limiting the navigation power to immediately adjacent wetlands. Id.
108. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
109. See Deaton, 332 F.3d at 707 ("The power over navigable waters also carries with it
the authority to regulate nonnavigable waters when that regulation is necessary to achieve
Congressional goals in protecting navigable waters.") (citing United States v. Grand River
Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 232 (1960); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313
U.S. 508, 525-26 (1941); United States v. Rio Grande Dam Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 70809 (1899)).
110. See H.R. REP. No. 92-911, at 131 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 92-1465, at 144 (1972)
(both reports indicating that the House committee fully intended that the term "navigable
waters" be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation); see also Deaton, 332
F.3d at 707 ("Indeed, the principle that Congress has the authority to regulate discharges
into nonnavigable tributaries in order to protect navigable waters has long been applied to
the Clean Water Act.") (citing Ashland Oil, 504 F.2d at 1325-29).
111. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
112. Id. at 133.
113. Id. at 134.
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reasoning, alluding to the "significant nexus" between the wetlands
and open water only to indicate what led the Riverside Bayview Court
to uphold federal jurisdiction in that case.114 As SWANCC merely
refused to undertake a substantial effects analysis, 115 there was no
indication in that case that the Court intended the navigable waters
doctrine to itself be recast as a more limited power.
The FD&P Enterprises court's interpretation of the "significant
nexus" language in SWANCC, as evidence that a "mere hydrological
connection"116 to a navigable water is not enough to establish federal
jurisdiction, is therefore inconsistent with precedent as well as the
well-settled federal power to keep pollution out of navigable waters.
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit's adjacency rationale unduly limits federal
jurisdiction to the facts of Riverside Bayview, completely ignoring
that Court's view of wetlands as inseparably bound up with waters of
the United States.
Both the adjacency and significant nexus tests are also less
manageable than the hydrological connection test.117 It is unclear what
a significant connection is - one that is obvious to the naked eye, or
one through which vast amounts of pollution can enter federal
waters. Either new jurisdictional test would require judicial assessment
of an area that is within the expertise of the Corps and EPA, with
little, if any, predictability. Thus, if federal regulations do
constitutionally extend to those waters that are connected to
navigable waters - which has been settled law since Riverside
Bayview - then any hydrological connection should suffice as far as
the courts are concerned.118

114. S WANCC, 531 U.S. at 167 ("Congress' concern for the protection of water quality
and aquatic ecosystems indicated its intent to regulate wetlands 'inseparably bound up with
the "waters" of the United States."'); see Wood, supra note 62, at 10202 (arguing that it
would be "completely illogical" to permit federal CWA jurisdiction to adjacent wetlands
into order to implement the CWA's goal of protecting water quality but not to allow such
jurisdiction over nonnavigable tributaries, "which have far greater importance to the quality
of the navigable waters than adjacent wetlands do").
115. See supra Section I.A.
116. FD&P Enters., 239 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
117. See Wood, supra note 62, at 10188 ("For example, it is unclear what water bodies
the Fifth Circuit's Needham panel would consider to be 'adjacent' to navigable-in-fact water
bodies, etc.").
118. Deaton held that if Congress has the authority to regulate nonnavigable waters as
part of its power over channels of commerce, it also has the authority to delegate it to the
Corps, provided Congress provides an "intelligible principle" - in this case, the goal of the
CWA itself: "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters" - upon which the Corps can base its regulatory decisions. Deaton, 332
F.3d at 707 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000)); see id.
("This use of delegated authority is well within Congress's traditional power over navigable
waters."). Thus, under the Chevron rule of deference, courts should defer to the Corps'
reasonable regulatory decisions in this area. See id. at 709-10.
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In addition to being both judicially manageable and consistent with
Congress's well-settled authority to regulate what actually enters the
channels of commerce, the hydrological connection standard is
actually quite a moderate use of the channels-of-commerce power. In
a notable post-Lopez channels-of-commerce case, National
Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt,119 the D.C. Circuit held that
the Endangered Species Act's prohibition against the "taking" of an
endangered species - the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly - was a
valid exercise of Congress's channels-of-commerce authority.120 The
court reasoned that for the taking clause to be preserved, it must be
extended to prevent "interstate actors"
in that case construction
materials and builders moving across state lines - from destroying the
endangered fly's habitat through their use of the channels of
commerce in building a hospital. 121
By comparison, the case for federal regulation of hydrologically
connected waters is a much easier one to make under the channels-of
commerce power. This is because navigable waters are themselves
channels of commerce over which there is clear federal jurisdiction.
Thus, the extension of L opez category one powers to cover
hydrologically connected waters that the Supreme Court has found to
be "inseparably bound up"122 with navigable waters, which actually are
channels of commerce, is quite moderate in light of existing post
Lopez case law in this area.123
-

Ill. STRUCTURAL FEDERALISM CONCERNS IN THE W ATER
P OLLUTION CONTROL A RENA

This Part argues that the hydrological connection test comports
with principles of federalism that have underscored the Supreme
Court's recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence.124 The need for
119. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
120. Id. at 1048-49.
121. Id. at 1048. The court's holding that Congress has the authority to regulate the
channels of interstate commerce so as to prevent the taking of an endangered species has
been criticized for its slippery-slope reasoning. See Calvert G. Chipchase, The Clean Water
Act: What's Commerce Got to D o With It?, 33 ENVTL L. REP. 10775, 10783 n.135 (2003),
available at http://www.elr.info/articles/vol33/33.10775.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2005)
("Judge Wald's argument would also transform any place where species stop or take refuge
into a channel of interstate commerce. Lopez inveighs against regulations that have no
identifiable stopping point, however."). This Note reserves comment on that ground.
122. See S WANCC, 531 U.S. at 167 (quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134).
123. As noted, the Deaton court also considered the "waters of the United States" to be
channels of commerce, over which Congress enjoys plenary policymaking authority. See
Deaton, 332 F.3d at 707-08.
124. Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lopez, along with the Court's other recent
Commerce Clause decision in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) , emphasized the
importance of limiting principles in Commerce Clause jurisprudence so as to avoid a federal
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limiting federal powers is not a new notion; Justice Cardozo once
wrote that the judicial inquiry is to distinguish "what is national and
what is local in the activities of commerce."125 Thus, one job of the
judiciary in Commerce Clause cases is to protect what is properly the
job of the states from federal intrusion.126 Moreover, the SWANCC
Court's use of the clear statement rule to protect this structural
federalism concem127 mandates that any complete analysis of the
constitutional scope of federal powers to regulate water pollution
consider the limitations imposed by that concern. As noted, the
navigable waters doctrine historically respects this important
concem.128 This Part, however, goes beyond the historical rationale
and asserts that federal regulation of water pollution under the
expansive navigable waters doctrine argued for here does not
"effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local and create a completely centralized government. "129
Two considerations are paramount to the structural federalism
analysis. First, the most prevalent concern in the modem
jurisprudence is that some areas of regulation must be left solely up to
the states to regulateY0 The second consideration is whether water
general police power. See Morrison 529 U.S. at 615-17; Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578-80 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); see also United States v. Ho, 3 1 1 F.3d 589, 604 (5th Cir. 2002)
(citing the need for limiting principles in valid Commerce Clause-based regulation in
upholding federal asbestos abatement requirements).
125. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935).
126. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
127. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 56 (noting the Court's
use of clear statement rules to protect underserved constitutional principles such as
federalism).
128. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (arguing that the navigable waters
doctrine assumes that navigable waters implicate important national concerns, whereas
nonnavigable waters do not).
129. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37).
130. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 ("Under the theories that the Government presents . . .
it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law
enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign."). Indeed, it seems
at times that the Court asserts states' rights as a matter of such importance without regard to
the regulation or policy at issue that one is hard pressed to decipher in what types of cases
the Court considers federal authority proper within the constitutional structure. Professor
Daniel Halberstam states:
The current majority has sought to revive some limitation on federal powers in an effort to
protect the states' role in the federal system. But . . . the Court refuses to appeal
systematically to any generalized principle of making the federal system work as a
productive whole. Instead, the Court frequently seems preoccupied with protecting state
autonomy as an end in itself. In other words, the Court generally relies less on a vision of the
legitimate role of the states within the overall system of democratic federal governance than
on appeals to what the states did or did not "surrender" upon joining the Union.
Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of Federal Systems,
90 VA. L. REV. 731, 795 (2004). Despite the unpredictability, this Note argues that water
pollution authority is a proper federal undertaking.
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pollution is an aspect of interstate commerce that states cannot
effectively manage without federal policy. Section III.A argues that
water pollution regulations are an essential part of national
environmental policy, which the Supreme Court has deemed distinct
from the traditional state power over land use. Section 111.B argues
that states cannot regulate pollution of navigable waters without
disturbing the policies of neighboring states, thus making it a proper
use of Congress's Commerce Clause authority to impose national
water pollution control standards.
A.

Water Pollution Regulations Are Properly Considered

Environmental Laws as Distinct from Land Use Regulations

The main federalism concern in both Lopez and SWANCC is that
traditional areas of state control must not be encroached upon by
federal regulation.131 In Lopez, that concern was the basis for the
nullification of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, and in SWANCC, it
was the basis for the Court's narrow construction of the CWA. In this
way, SWANCC echoed what critics of federal wetland enforcement
have long argued: that federal water pollution laws encroach on land
use requirements, "perhaps the quintessential state activity."132
However, the Supreme Court has distinguished the two as separate
types of laws.
The argument that environmental protection measures are land
use requirements has been addressed and squarely rejected by the
Supreme Court in California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock
Co.133 Central to the Court's analysis was whether a California
environmental law amounted to an illegitimate land use regulation on

131. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174 (refusing to undertake the substantial effects
analysis in light of existing federalism concerns because Congress had not indicated a clear
intent for such expansive regulations as the MBR); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (rejecting an
argument for the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones Act on the ground that
such reasoning would, if accepted, establish a general police power of the sort only enjoyed
by the states).
132. See Adler, supra note 8, at 36 (quoting Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 ( 1982)). Although the S WANCC Court did note the land
use concern, it specifically left open the question whether federal water pollution regulations
amount to an unconstitutional breach of Commerce Clause authority. See SWANCC, 531
U.S. at 173-74. In contrast, the Court has held that despite the implications for land use,
regulating the environmental harms resulting from surface mining is constitutional because
of the substantial effect on interstate commerce. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 281 (1981).
133. 480 U.S. 572 ( 1987). In this case, a mining company sought relief from a state
environmental compliance requirement on federal land on the grounds that the law was
tantamount to a state land use regulation on federal land. Id. at 576-77. The mining company
argued that only federal environmental laws should apply on federal land, and that states
have no right to apply their environmental laws, which the company characterized as land
use regulations, on federal property. Id. at 580.
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federal property. The Court held that the California law is an
environmental regulation that does not determine the basic uses of the
federal land.134 The Court distinguished between land use and
environmental regulations on the ground that "[l]and use planning in
essence chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation,
at its core, does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires
only that, however the land is used, damage to the environment is
kept within prescribed limits."135 Drawing such a distinction is not
necessarily obvious, as the "line between environmental
regulation and land use planning will not always be bright."136 The
Court, however, deferred to Congress's indication of "its
understanding of land use planning and environmental regulation as
distinct activities."137
The Court's recognition of environmental laws as distinct from
land use laws - even where there is some overlap between the two alleviates the concern underlying Lopez and Morrison about federal
infringement of states' rights.138 Thus, the Court should, by its own
rationale, be far less concerned about opening the flood gates to
myriad federal police powers by upholding federal water regulations
than, for example, by upholding federal criminal statutes.
The SWANCC Court carefully avoided this analysis, however. In
employing the clear statement rule, the Court indicated only that the
substantial effects-based jurisdiction argued for by the Corps would
raise the difficult constitutional question of encroachment into the
area of land use, not that the substantial effects analysis would
invariably preclude federal jurisdiction on that ground.139 The Court

134. Id. at 586-87.
135. Id. at 587.
136. Id.
137. Id. The dissent in SWANCC cited California Coastal for support of federal
environmental laws. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 191 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent was
specifically refuting the majority's suggestion that the Corps' interpretation of the statute
encroached upon the traditional state power over land use, concluding that "[t]he CWA is
not a land-use code; it is a paradigm of environmental regulation. Such regulation is an
accepted exercise of federal power." Id. However, settling this dispute between the majority
and dissent was not relevant to the outcome in S WANCC since the Court needed only to
identify - not resolve - a serious constitutional concern in order to avoid the analysis. See
supra Part I (discussing the SWANCC Court's use of the clear statement rule as a canon of
statutory construction).
138. But see Peter Arey Gilbert, Note, The Migratory Bird Rule after Lopez·
Questioning the Value of State Sovereignty in the Context of Wetland Regulation, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1695, 1727 (1998) (arguing that all of CWA § 404 regulates land use, a
traditional state function). Gilbert goes on to conclude, however, that the MBR does not
undermine important federalism concerns, primarily because states cannot effectively
manage wetland protection due to pressure to deregulate, thus creating a "race to the
bottom." See id. at 1735.
139. S WANCC, 531 U.S. at 173-74. This particular method of constitutional avoidance is
controversial precisely because it does not permit agency interpretations that may in fact be
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specifically declined to evaluate whether or not federal jurisdiction
over isolated wetlands would amount to an unconstitutional
encroachment upon the traditional state power over land use.140 In
fact, such federal jurisdiction would not, in light of California Coastal,
be a federal land use regulation.
Moreover, denying federal jurisdiction under the federalism
rationale would require characterizing wetlands as "lands" rather than
"waters." But as the dissent in SWANCC pointed out, the Court has
already spoken on that issue, holding in no uncertain terms in
Riverside Bayview that wetlands are "waters of the United States."141
Thus, denying federal jurisdiction over hydrologically connected
wetlands on the basis of a federal usurpation of the state power to
regulate land use would be contrary to both California Coastal and
Riverside Bayview.142

In addition to the precedent that should guide the constitutional
analysis, the approach to federalism taken by the California Coastal
Court is illuminating for its focus on broad sectors of social regulation,
specifically environmental policy and land use policy. The Court did
not seek to draw a line within these broad sectors demarcating the
point at which federal jurisdiction ends and state authority begins.
Such an approach is often advocated in the context of water pollution
control,143 but always misses the point. Federalism concerns have not
typically sought to determine which bodies of water only the states get
to regulate and which the federal authorities get to regulate. Rather,
the federalism concern is primarily about whether there is federal
encroachment into an entire area that has been traditionally left to the
states, such as crime, education or family law.144 The long history of
federal control over the nation's navigable waters145 illustrates that this
is not such an area of law.

constitutional. Under this canon, interpretations that merely raise significant constitutional
questions and are not clearly intended by Congress are prohibited. See Sunstein, supra note
55, at 331.
140. S WANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
141. Id. at 184, 191 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 123).
142. One may conjecture that perhaps the S WANCC Court's method of constitutional
avoidance was utilized in protection of the Court's federalism concerns because the
substantial effects analysis would not actually limit federal jurisdiction in light of Riverside
Bayview and California Coastal. See generally Halberstam, supra note 130, at 795 (arguing
that the Court seems to be "preoccupied" with asserting state autonomy as an end in itself).
143. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 8, at 36; Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 13, at 11058
("Regulating drainage ditches, ephemeral waters and wetlands that are not immediately
adjacent to navigable waters will extend the federal government into 'the primary
responsibilities and rights of States . . . to plan the development and use . . . of land and
water resources.'" (quoting S WANCC, 531 U.S. at 174)).
144. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
145. See supra Part I.
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The First Principles of Interstate Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Support Federal Regulation of Water Pollution

Limiting federal authority to navigable-in-fact waters and their
directly adjacent wetlands would undermine the rationale behind the
Interstate Commerce Clause itself. The "first principles" of federal
regulation of interstate commerce endorse the notion that federal
control should extend to areas where the states may interfere with
each other's efforts.146 Indeed, Lopez cited language in Gibbons
indicating that only internal commerce which "does not extend to or
affect other States" is beyond the reach of federal powers over
commerce.147 The long standing rationale for federal water pollution
control is based on this very principle of "subsidiarity," which dictates
that federal control is necessary where the states cannot effectively
regulate themselves.148 In fact, the transboundary nature of water
pollution poses the identical problem that gave rise to the need for an
exclusive federal power over interstate commerce in the first place.
Water pollution can be transferred from one state to another, because
states often share the same river, lake or other hydrological
connection with other states' waters.149 Thus, even states with strong
water pollution control standards would suffer from water pollution
because of weak standards in neighboring states.
Prior to the enactment of a federal water pollution statute, the
problem of ineffective state control led to the very "animosity and
discord" between states that Hamilton intended national standards to
prevent.150 In 1906, a water pollution dispute led to litigation between
the States of Missouri and Illinois. In Missouri v. Illinois,151 Missouri
charged that Illinois's dumping of Chicago's sewage flowed via Illinois
waters into the Mississippi River, causing a nuisance for the residents
of St. Louis - notably, an increased incidence of typhoid.152 When
Chicago began dumping its sewage into a canal and down the
Mississippi, its incidence of typhoid fell sharply from more than eighty

146. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. Hamilton famously wrote in Federalist No. 22 that a
central goal of the Interstate Commerce Clause was to tame the "interfering and
unneighborly regulations of some States [which] if not restrained by a national control"
would become increasingly "serious sources of animosity and discord." THE FEDERALIST
No. 22, at 144-45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter & Charles R. Keiser ed., 1999).
147. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553 (quoting Gibbons
(1824)).
148. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 62, at 10193.
149. Id. at 10194.
150. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 146, at 144-45.
151. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
152. Id. at 524.

v.

Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194
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cases per 100,000 to fewer than ten per 100,000.153 Thus,
Illinois effectively sent Missouri its typhoid problem via
transboundary water pollution.
Despite the demonstrated inability of states to regulate water
pollution so as not to interfere with each other, a noted
"environmental federalist," Jonathan Adler, has argued that states can
more effectively regulate wetlands than the federal government.154
Even Adler, however, acknowledges that the constitutional limits to
federal authority would not prevent regulation of activities that result
in the pollution of a navigable waterway.155
Because of the transboundary nature of water pollution, it affects
more than one state.156 As Missouri v. Illinois illustrates, water
pollution is a classic element of commerce between states that
frequently cannot be managed effectively without national controls.157
Thus, the original subsidiarity rationale for federal power over
commerce justifies federal regulation in this area. Finally, the
hydrological connection test - because a navigable-in-fact waterway
must be involved - ensures that federal water pollution law is not
expanded beyond a point which the subsidiarity rationale can support.
IV.

E CONOMIC OR N ONECONOMIC: P OTENTIAL REGULATION OF

WATER POLLUTION UNDER THE S UBSTANTIAL EFFECTS D OCTRINE
WOULD S ATISFY THE LOPEZ STANDARD

Lopez revived the historic federalism tenets of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, and cast doubt over the constitutional foundation of
environmental laws.158 Nevertheless, this Part argues that potential
federal regulation of isolated, intrastate wetlands would satisfy the

153. See ROBERT v. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw SCIENCE
AND POLICY 78 (4th ed., 2003).
154. Adler, supra note 8, at 41-54. Adler makes both policy and legal arguments against
expansive federal wetland controls. He appears to be limiting his argument that states can
more effectively regulate wetlands to the policy arena; he argues against substantial effects
based federal regulations on legal grounds. See id. This Note addresses the substantial effects
arguments in the context of potential regulation of isolated wetlands in Part IV.
155. Id. at 36-37. Adler later argues, however, that applying a Lopez substantial effects
analysis to wetlands might "free up" from federal regulation not only isolated, intrastate
wetlands, but also hydrologically connected wetlands. Id. at 40. However, this latter
argument ignores Congress's authority to regulate connected wetlands pursuant to its
channels-of-commerce powers.
156. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824), quoted in United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
157. Missouri
144-45.

v.

Illinois, 202 U.S. at 524; see also THE FEDERALIST, supra note 146, at

158. See Tanabe, supra note 45, at 1060-61 n.75.
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Lopez substantial effects analysis.159 Four factors make up the analysis:
whether the activity being regulated is economic; whether the law at
issue contains a "jurisdictional element" that courts can use on a case
by-case basis to determine the effect on interstate commerce; the
presence of Congressional findings should the effect on interstate
commerce not be "visible to the naked eye"; and, finally, the degree of
attenuation between the actual regulated activity and the effect on
interstate commerce.160
The economic/noneconomic distinction seems to be the only
"make-or-break" element,161 and the primary basis for the outcomes of
Lopez162 and Morrison.163 Section IV.A argues that wetland regulation
almost always involves economic activity. Whether the reasoning
employed in determining the regulated activity's connection to
interstate commerce is "attenuated" is also an important element
because it seeks to limit the activities within the federal government's
reach to those that are truly part of interstate commerce, thus denying
the federal government a general police power, a role reserved for the
states.164 Section IV.B argues that making the link between the
economic activity affecting wetlands and interstate commerce does not
require attenuated reasoning. Congressional findings165 and the

159. It is worth noting that some commentators have argued that in the area of water
regulation, the traditional navigable waters doctrine is the only proper constitutional limit to
federal regulatory authority over the nation's waters. See, e.g., Chipchase, supra note 121;
Albrecht supra note 13. This is a problematic argument, though, because it would in effect
limit Congress's authority to regulate water pollution more severely than Lopez and
Morrison limit the federal commerce power generally. Specifically, by limiting Congress's
powers in this area to the navigation power, no matter how permissive that power is, the
limitation would undermine Congress's ability to regulate activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce and involve nonnavigable waters.
160. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-565.
161. See Halberstam, supra note 130, at 796-<J?. Halberstam argues that Lopez created a
new formal approach to delimiting Congress's Commerce Clause authority that cabins the
authority in three areas: "l) the channels of interstate commerce, 2) the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, and 3) '"economic' activities . . . {that} must 'substantially affect
interstate commerce. "' Id. at 796 (emphasis added). Thus Halberstam, for one, views the
substantial effects category as strictly limited to economic activities.
162. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
163. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11 (discussing the importance of the economic nature of
the activity regulated by federal law).
164. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
165. The Morrison Court, in striking down the Violence Against Women Act, reviewed
extensive Congressional findings regarding the aggregate effects of violence against women
on interstate commerce, but nonetheless denied federal jurisdiction to prosecute under the
Act. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617. There are myriad ways in which isolated wetlands affect
interstate commerce, including use by migratory birds. It has been argued that the migratory
bird "community," including bird aficionados who travel across state lines for observation
purposes, as well as the scientific community that observes migration patterns, affects
interstate commerce because of the total value of the industry surrounding the birds. See
Tanya M. White & Patrick R. Douglas, Postponing the Inevitable: The Supreme Court
A voids Deciding Whether the Migratory Bird Rule Passes Commerce Clause Muster, 9 Mo.
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presence of a jurisdictional element166 are not dispositive elements,
and thus are not the focus of this analysis.
It is worthwhile here to reiterate that as far as the Supreme Court
is concerned, Congress has not yet passed any legislation regulating
water pollution that should be analyzed under this framework.167 Thus,
the following analysis determines the proper constitutional limits to
potential federal water pollution regulation over non-hydrologically
connected waters.168 The emphasis of any such new legislation will
undoubtedly be on the regulation of isolated wetlands.169

ENvrL. L. & POL'Y REV. 9, 20 (2001). However, one prominent criticism of the Migratory
Bird Rule (MBR) is that, even assuming a statutory basis for it, it would in effect make every
body of land or water in the country subject to a federal regulation since migrating birds can
potentially alight anywhere. Thus, relying on migrating birds does not satisfy the
requirements of Lopez and Morrison that there be some limit to federal jurisdiction. See
Adler, supra note 8, at 28-30 (discussing the inadequacies of the MBR). Other valuable
functions affecting interstate commerce include flood control, the preservation of surface
and ground water quality, and preservation of water supply. These impacts, while clearly
valuable, also do not, by themselves, make the case for federal jurisdiction. Id. at 33-34
(asserting that the value of wetlands is not relevant to the constitutionality of federal
regulation of them). Rather, as discussed infra, the activity that pollutes wetlands is
inherently commercial and hence is the sounder basis for federal controls. Under the
Lopez/Morrison framework, it is only if the regulated activity is "economic" that the myriad
impacts on interstate commerce matter. See Halberstam, supra note 130, at 795.
166. The Lopez Court identified the usefulness of a jurisdictional element in a statute
that "might limit its reach to a discrete set of [regulated intrastate activities) that additionally
have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
The term "navigable waters" in the current CWA could be characterized as a jurisdictional
element, see Chipchase, supra note 121 , at 10786, but this Note has asserted a different and
more traditional use of that term. Moreover, the substantial effects analysis, of which a
jurisdictional element is part, is only needed to regulate waters that are beyond the scope of
the navigation power. Still, though, no appeals court has struck down federal legislation for
the lack of a jurisdictional element, and nothing in Lopez or Morrison indicates that this it is
a required element in tlie legislation. See, e.g., GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d
622, 640 (5th Cir. 2003) (interpreting the ESA's take provision to apply only to instances
where there is a connection to interstate commerce). For example, the Ho court found that
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) did not limit the scope of the asbestos
workplace standard by means of any kind of jurisdictional element, but declared this
deficiency not detrimental to the statute. United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 603 n.13 (5th
Cir. 2002).
167. See supra Part I discussing the SWANCC Court's holding that the CWA does not
invoke the constitutionally questionable substantial effects power in regulating "navigable
waters," and "waters of the United States."
168. This assumes, of course, that this Note's analysis to this point is right, and that tlie
CWA does not currently reach isolated, intrastate wetlands. However, until SWANCC, it
was widely accepted that the CWA did authorize regulation of such wetlands. See infra notes
29-37 and accompanying text. Thus, much pre-SWANCC commentary and regulatory effort
has focused on the constitutionality of isolated wetland regulation and is referred to in this
Part.
169. See, e.g., S. 473, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003) (asserting federal jurisdiction over isolated
wetlands); H.R. 962, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003) (same).
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Wetland Protections Regulate Economic Activity

Within the substantial effects analysis, the most significant
consideration regarding Congress's power to invoke the aggregation
principle to regulate wholly intrastate activities is whether the
regulated activity is economic, or commercial, in nature.170 As
SWANCC noted, almost any application of such legislation could only
be upheld under the aggregation principle,171 which permits federal
laws to reach minor individual instances of conduct based on the
aggregate effect of like instances on interstate commerce, thus meeting
the substantial effects test.172 For a court to consider the aggregate
effects of the regulated activity on interstate commerce, that activity
almost certainly must be economic in nature.173
The Supreme Court in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Association, Inc.174 upheld federal water and land quality
protection measures because the regulated activity was economic in
nature. Hodel involved a Commerce Clause challenge to the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act. The Act was designed to
"establish a nationwide program to protect society and the
environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining
operations,"175 and specifically required that the mining land and
affected water be restored to its natural condition.176

170. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 ("Where economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.").
171. Because Congress can regulate only activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce, the relatively minor effects of individual instances of activities would be beyond
federal reach if not for the Court's acceptance of Congress's ability to regulate individual
instances of activity that in the aggregate substantially affect interstate commerce. This is the
basis of federal regulation first upheld in Wickard v. Fi/bum, 317 U.S. 1 1 1 , 127-28 (1942).
The Supreme Court recently affirmed Wickard's aggregation principle. Gonzales v. Raich,
No. 03-1454, 2005 U.S. Lexis 4656, at *29-*35.
172. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (holding that because the GFSZA did not regulate
economic activity, it could not be upheld under the aggregation principle). The aggregation
principle has been recently applied by the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589
(5th Cir. 2002), in upholding the Clean Air Act's federal asbestos removal performance
requirements, as well as both the Fifth and D.C. Circuits in upholding challenges to the
Endangered Species Act's take provision. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003); Rancho
Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
173. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 ("While we need not adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide [Morrison], thus far in
our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate
activity only where the activity is economic in nature.") (emphasis added). The economic
activity requirement is not a widely-accepted hard-and-fast rule, however. The Fifth Circuit
considers it an open question whether the Supreme Court allows regulation of noneconomic
intrastate activity under the aggregation principle. See Ho, 311 F.3d at 600.
174. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
175. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 268 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1976 ed., Supp. III)).
176. This included the restoration of land to its approximate original contour,
segregation and preservation of topsoil, and minimization of disturbance to the hydrologic
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The Supreme Court rejected the Commerce Clause challenge and
the claim that the Act regulated land use, an activity traditionally left
to the states.177 The Court's rationale was that Congress may clearly
regulate the conditions under which goods are shipped where the local
activity of producing the goods affects interstate commerce.178 The
limited judicial scrutiny applied in Hodel indicated that Congress had
nearly plenary power to enact environmental laws, irrespective of
whether the laws infringed on traditional state functions.179
Although L opez provides a more structured framework for
evaluating the constitutionality of substantial effects-based
regulations, it does not require more than rational basis scrutiny and
does not preclude consideration of past Commerce Clause cases,
including Hodel.180 The Lopez Court specifically cited Hodel as an
example of a case that upheld regulation of "intrastate economic
activity."181 Despite the Lopez Court's characterization of Hodel as a
case of pure economic regulation, Hodel involved more than this.
Hodel held that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause
to legislate to protect land and water resources from the effects of a
particular economic activity - surface mining. Thus, even in Lopez
there is a hint that the Court considers environmental regulations to
be an aspect of the regulation of economic activities.182
Water pollution almost always results from activity similarly
commercial to surface mmmg, namely: chemical dumping,
development of housing structures, shopping malls, parking lots, even

balance. Id. at 269. The federal role under the Act was predominant over the role of the
states, which merely issued permits that complied with requirements set by the Secretary of
the Interior. There was also federal enforcement. Id. at 270-71 .
177. Hodel, 452 U.S. a t 270; see also, Adler supra note 8, a t 3 6 (asserting that
"regulation of land use is perhaps the quintessentially state activity" (quoting Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982))).
178. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 281.
179. Id. at 276 (applying a rational basis test). Despite the sweeping holding,
Rehnquist's concurrence in Hodel articulated a limit to Commerce Clause powers. Id. at 311
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). In addressing the expansion of Commerce Clause powers,
Rehnquist expressed uncertainty as to whether the "substantial effects" test had been
restated as simply an "effects" test. Id. at 312 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). He nonetheless
accepted the government's argument as rational, even though, in his view, "there can be no
doubt that Congress in regulating surface mining has stretched its authority to the 'nth
degree."' Id. at 3 1 1 .
1 80. Lopez, 5 1 4 U . S . a t 559 (citing Hodel with approval); Raich, No. 03-1454, 2005 U.S.
Lexis 4656, at *38 ("We need not determine whether respondents' activities, taken in the
aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a 'rational basis'
exists for so concluding.") (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, and Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-80).
1 8 1. Id.
182. The Lopez Court did not discuss the environmental aspects of Hodel, only
describing the case as upholding regulation of "interstate coal mining." Lopez, 514 U.S. at
559.
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sports stadiums.183 Like the Hodel regulations, the CWA's permit
requirement almost always applies to commercial projects. However,
as it is currently written, the C WA prevents the discharge of pollutants
into wetlands associated with any activity and for any reason.184 Thus,
one difference between water pollution regulations and the
environmental performance requirements in Hodel is that the latter
only restricted the discharge of pollutants resulting from surface
mining activities, which are plainly economic in nature.185 Current
CWA-based water pollution regulations apply, at least superficially, to
economic and noneconomic activity, the latter of which Lopez and
Morrison inveigh against regulating.
This feature of the CWA has inspired criticisms focusing on the
alleged noneconomic nature of wetland regulation.186 Adler, for
instance, noted that the filling of wetlands is not "inherently economic
or commercial in nature," pointing to such examples as expanding
one's home,187 or even walking or riding a bicycle through a wetland.188

183. See Bueschen, supra note 2, at 951.
184. The CWA's permit requirement does not distinguish between economic and
noneconomic activities; it simply says "the Secretary may issue permits, after notice and
opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters." 31 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
185. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (citing Hodel as an example of a case upholding
regulation of intrastate economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce).
Interestingly, the law in Hodel was valid even though the regulations involved had obvious
land use implications. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 311 (Rehnquist, J., concurring, despite the
possible infringement on state autonomy in the area of land use regulation).
186. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 8, at 34; Chipchase, supra note 121, at 10785-86.
187. Adler, supra note 8, at 34-35 ("Many wetland permits concern nothing more than a
family's effort to expand its home."). Construction or expansion of single family homes is
subject to a "general" or "nationwide" permit, which, unlike a typical section 404 permit
applied for by commercial developers, "requires minimal effort on the part of the applicant."
60 Fed. Reg. 38,650, 38,653 (July 27, 1995). This nationwide permit program is designed to
simply allow such small-scale wetlands activities as expanding one's home, while freeing up
agency resources to focus on commercial activities that more substantially impact wetlands.
Id. at 38,650. Thus, the permit requirement for single family homes, like the hypothetical
federal regulation of walking through a wetland, may be considered so minimal as not to
disturb the efficacy of the wetland regulatory scheme. See infra notes 194-195 and
accompanying text.
Because of the small scale of single family home expansion, whether or not this is a
commercial activity within the scope of substantial effects-based regulation is not central to
this Note's argument that regulation of isolated wetlands is valid because of the focus on
commercial activity. Indeed, this single family home facet, minimal as it is, of the section 404
permit program could be struck down without affecting the constitutionality of the bulk of
the program, which is the focus of this Note. Thus, this Note does not attempt to
characterize the expansion of one's home as either economic or noneconomic activity.
188. Adler, supra note 8, at 35 ("Moreover, the Corps has asserted that it could regulate
'walking, bicycling, or driving a vehicle through a wetland,' if it so chose, because such
activities could result in the 'discharge of dredged material.' Clearly, regulatory authority of
this scope extends far beyond the regulation of purely commercial activity, and is therefore
constitutionally suspect."). There is in fact no record of a section 404 permit issuance for
conducting any of these activities. In the very regulations Adler cites for his assertion that
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Further, the argument goes, it is not the wetland's "value" in either an
economic or ecological sense that makes regulating it constitutional. It
is the "connection to interstate commerce,''189 which is just as non
existent in the case of backyard wetlands as in the case of guns in
school zones.190
As an initial matter, the insignificance of the noneconomic impacts
on wetlands means that the CWA could simply be limited to economic
activity without losing much, if any, protective force.191 Second,
notwithstanding the remote possibility of federal regulation of walking
through wetlands on a Sunday afternoon stroll, filling wetlands is far
more economic than the criminal activities at issue in Lopez and
Morrison . Filling wetlands with fill material and other pollutants is
typically done by commercial actors for a commercial profit.192
Post-Lopez cases have recognized, just as Hodel did, that where
economic activity produces environmental harms, the environmental
regulation constitutes an inseparable part of the regulation of the
economic activity.193 Moreover, these cases have addressed and
rejected arguments emphasizing the mere theoretical possibility that
minor noncommercial activity, such as walking through a protected
wetland, can violate the regulation and hence prove the noneconomic
nature of the regulated activity.194 Such illustrations do not undermine
the efficacy of a complex set of regulations designed primarily to
regulate commercial activity so as to minimize the environmental
consequences of it.195 Thus, launching a constitutional attack on water
the Corps could regulate these activities, the Corps indicated that "[a]ctivities such as
walking, bicycling or driving a vehicle through a wetland would have de minimis effects
except in extraordinary situations, and the agencies do not intend to devote scarce resources
to regulating such typically innocuous activities." 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,020 (Aug. 25,
1993). Moreover, it is far from clear that such authority would be "constitutionally suspect."
The Court recently affirmed that when "a general statute bears a substantial relation to
commerce, the de rninirnis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no
consequence." Raich, No. 03-1454, 2005 U.S. Lexis 4656, at *30 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at
558, and Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n. 27 (1968)).
189. Adler, supra note 8, at 37.
190. Id. ("An isolated wetland's value, ecological or otherwise, in and of itself, cannot
form the basis of federal jurisdiction any more than the value of well-educated school
children can provide the basis for federal regulation of guns in schools.").
191. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,020 (Aug. 25, 1993) (noting the minimal impacts of
noneconomic activities on wetlands).
1 92. See, e.g., Wilson, 133 F.3d at 254.
193. See GDF Realty, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003); Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2002).
194. See Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1 077 ("Hence, because much activity regulated by
the ESA does bear a substantial relation to commerce, it may well be that the hiker
hypothetical proffered by the plaintiff is 'of no consequence' to the statute's
constitutionality.") (citations omitted).
195. See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981) ("A complex regulatory
program . . . can survive a Commerce Clause challenge without a showing that every single
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pollution regulations based on unrealistic illustrations is not a critique
that will influence the developing jurisprudence. Wetland protection
regulations focus on commercial activity and should be sustained for
that reason.
An example of sustaining environmental regulations on the basis
of their focus on economic activity is the Fifth Circuit's recent decision
in United States v. Ho.196 The Ho court deemed asbestos removal to be
"very much a commercial activity" in today's economy because of its
connection to commercial purposes such as building renovation or
demolition for land use.197 Wetland regulations are substantially the
same as asbestos removal safeguards in this regard: they both regulate
activity that is a necessary precursor to commercial development.198
In Lopez and Morrison, the issue was clear: gun possession and
gender- motivated violence were "in no sense" economic activities.199
The same can hardly be said of wetlands regulation. Indeed, one is
hard pressed to imagine the need for such regulations without the
presence of a large, national commercial development market, and
other significant economic activities.200 However, the economic nature
of wetland regulation also illustrates that should the Court reverse
course and demand the kind of precision in each and every regulation
that avoids even theoretical misuses of the commerce power, the
CWA and its regulations could - if extended to isolated wetlands be re-written to reach only economic activity without losing any force.
facet of the program is independently and directly related to a valid congressional goal. It is
enough that the challenged provisions are an integral part of the regulatory program and
that the regulatory scheme when considered as a whole satisfies [the Commerce Oause]
test."). As noted, the single family home expansion permit requirement poses a more
difficult question, but one that is not central to this Note's argument that isolated wetlands
legislation could be validly enacted because of the focus on commercial activity. See supra
note 187.
196. 311 F.3d 589 (2000).
197. Ho, 311 F.3d at 602.
198. Both the Ho court and the Nat'/ Assn of Home Builders court framed the
respective regulations as applying primarily to economic activities rather than environmental
protection. The D.C. Circuit took notice of this fact in Rancho Viejo. The Rancho Viejo
court also rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the ESA's take provision because the
court considered the regulated activity to be the construction of a commercial housing
development rather than the destruction of an endangered species. 323 F.3d at 1077-78.
199. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 573-74).
200. While this Note has focused on commercial development, that is certainly not the
only type of commercial activity that poses a threat to water quality. United States v. Eidson,
108 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 1997), was a CWA enforcement case in which Eidson, whose
business was cleaning underground gasoline tanks for gas and service stations, simply
dumped untreated petroleum waste into nonnavigable tributaries of Florida's Tampa Bay,
which then killed untold numbers of fish. Eidson was clearly a commercial actor attempting
to gain a competitive advantage in his market by avoiding a cost of doing his type of
business. Such economic activity has long been held to be within reach of the Commerce
Clause. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60 (discussing the Court's approval of regulations on a
wide variety of economic activity).
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Upholding Federal Wetland Regulations Does Not Require
Attenuated Reasoning

The substantial effects analysis does not permit attenuated
reasoning in demonstrating a connection between the regulated
activity and interstate commerce.201 The purpose this element serves is
to disallow limitless arguments that could justify federal control of
nearly any activity. Because wetland destruction is typically a
consequence of commercial development projects, this element of the
L opez analysis does not appear to stifle regulation of isolated
wetlands.202 As long as the activity that pollutes or degrades the
wetland is commercial, the imagination need not strain itself in order
to conclude that a federal permitting requirement is part of
a larger economic scheme relating to industrial or commercial uses of
water resources.
For instance, the Ho court found, "most importantly," that the
relationship between asbestos removal and interstate commerce was
"direct and apparent."203 The court found rational Congress's
recognition of a national asbestos market and Ho's activities' injuries
to it.204 Specifically, Ho gained a commercial advantage on licensed
asbestos abatement companies by ignoring the cost-imposing federal
standards.205 Moreover, the court noted that "the presence of a
national market in the regulated activity also serves as a limiting
principle"206 in the sense that activities unrelated to a national
commercial market would not be reached under the regulations.
While it could be argued, just as Adler has in the case of wetland
regulations,207 that the asbestos requirements at issue in Ho are too far
removed from interstate commerce because of the potential that a
private home owner would have to comply when expanding his or her
house,208 the presence of a national market and the directly
intertwined nature of the regulations with what is usually commercial
activity was enough to uphold the federal regulations, just as these
201. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (holding that the government's reasoning demonstrating a
link between interstate commerce and gun possession in a school zone was too tenuous).
202. See GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 640 (holding that the "ESA is an economic regulatory
scheme").
203. Ho, 311 F.3d at 603.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 604 & n.15 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-57 (1971)
(national market for commercial credit), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 1 1 1 , 127-28 (1942)
(national market for wheat)).
207. See supra notes 187-190 and accompanying text.
208. See Adler, supra note 8, at 34-35 (discussing the possibility of needing a federal
pernlit to expand one's home if situated on a wetland).
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CONCLUSION

Many have argued that SWANCC substantially restricted
previously expansive federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause.
In fact, SWANCC was not such a case. Rather, SWANCC's impact
will, taken with Lopez, be to contribute to a more structured
constitutional framework of water pollution laws, and the analysis
employed by courts charged with reviewing them. Specifically,
SWANCC's use of the clear statement rule indicates the soundness of
the navigable waters doctrine as a constitutional principle. Taken with
Lopez's affirmation of Congress's plenary power over the channels of
commerce, the navigation power supports jurisdiction over any
wetland that is hydrologically connected to a navigable body of water.
SWANCC's use of the clear statement rule to avoid a substantial
effects analysis of wetland regulation also indicates that Congress has
not yet exercised its substantial effects authority in this area. Thus,
isolated, intrastate wetlands are beyond the reach of federal
jurisdiction under the CWA as it is currently written. However,
because wetland protections typically regulate economic activity,
Congress can through a clear use of its substantial effects
power properly enact legislation aimed at protecting isolated,
intrastate wetlands.
Although some may prefer no federal regulation over isolated
wetlands as a matter of policy, the Constitution is more permissive,
especially in light of the lack of a competing traditional state
function.209 Water pollution control has developed into an important
national concern, and it will only become more critical to the nation's
welfare as time passes and water resources become ever scarcer. A
federal water protection regime can, on a sound constitutional basis,
seek to protect the nation's waters from commercial pollution.

209. There is a relevant and meaningful policy argument about whether wetland
protection policy is best made and implemented by the states or federal agencies. See Adler,
supra note 8, at 40-54 (arguing for a policy of "wetland federalism" because of the superior
effectiveness of state regulation of wetlands). It is important, however, to maintain the
distinction between what is within federal constitutional reach, and whether federal control
is preferable to state control as a matter of policy.

